We investigate the problem of optimal risk sharing between agents endowed with cashinvariant choice functions which are law-invariant with respect to different reference probability measures. We motivate a discrete setting both from an operational and a theoretical point of view, and give sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto optimal allocations in this framework. Our results are illustrated by several examples.
level of protection. As described above it is very likely that the agents weight these scenarios in a different way depending on their respective information. Moreover, it turns out that, in practice, such a set of scenarios is usually finite, thus reducing the optimal risk allocation problem to a finite dimensional risk exchange on these base scenarios. In this framework, and under some mild additional conditions, we show that there always exist Pareto optimal allocations for any aggregate risk. Our results are illustrated by several examples. In particular, we also give examples which show that Pareto optimal allocations do not exist in general if we drop some of our assumptions (Examples 4.3 and 4.4).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the optimal risk sharing problem, and we state our main result on the existence of optimal allocations (Theorem 2.3). This result is then proved in Section 3. Our examples are collected in Section 4. We assume the reader to be familiar with basic convex duality as outlined in [26] or [12] . However, in the appendix we give a short review on some basic concepts and notation from convex analysis which are frequently used throughout the paper. Some known results are also postponed to the appendix.
Optimal Risk Sharing Problem

Framework
We consider a measurable space (Ω, F) and two probability measures P 1 , P 2 on (Ω, F) such that (Ω, F, P i ), i = 1, 2, are non-atomic standard probability spaces. The measures P 1 , P 2 describe the view of two agents, say 1 and 2, on the world (Ω, F). The preferences of the i-th agent on L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) are represented by a choice function U i : L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) → R, that throughout the paper is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
(C1) concavity:
and α ∈ (0, 1); (C2) cash-invariance: U i (X + c) = U i (X) + c for all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) and c ∈ R;
(C3) normalization: U i (0) = 0; (C4) P i -law-invariance: U i (X) = U i (Y ) whenever X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) are identically distributed under P i ;
(C5) upper semi-continuity (u.s.c.): for any sequence (X n ) n∈N ⊂ L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) converging to some X ∈ L ∞ , we have U i (X) ≥ lim sup n U i (X n ).
If U i in addition is monotone, i.e. U i (X) ≥ U i (Y ) whenever X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) satisfy X ≥ Y P i -a.s., then U i is a P i -law-invariant monetary utility function, i.e. −U i is a P i -law-invariant convex risk measure in the sense of Föllmer and Schied [18] . Note that (C5) is equivalent to the continuity of U i because U i is finitely-valued (see e.g. [12] Corollary 2.5), and that any proper function on L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) which is monotone and satisfies (C2) is automatically finitely-valued and 1-Lipschitz-continuous (see [18] ). It is proved in [23] that the P i -lawinvariance ensures the following dual representation for U i (the so-called Fatou property):
where V i is the dual U * i of U i (see (B.1)). Note how this representation of U i can be seen as a worst-case evaluation, based on the set of test measures Q i = {Q σ-additive measure : Q P i , V i ( dQ dPi ) < ∞}, where to each test measure Q ∈ Q i is associated a penalty V i ( dQ dPi ) which expresses the confidence of agent i on Q (the higher the penalty, the lower the confidence on that measure).
Here we fix the space L ∞ (Ω, F, P i ) of P i -essentially-bounded random variables as the set of possible financial positions considered by agent i. However, we can also think of the choice functions as defined on L pi (Ω, F, P i ), for any p i in [1, ∞] and possibly p 1 = p 2 . Note that we do not require the P i 's to fulfill any absolute continuity-or even equivalence-relation. A priori the world views P 1 and P 2 are unrelated.
Formulation of the Problem
The problem we address in this paper is the optimal sharing and allocation of risk between two agents who have different views of the world, in the sense described in Section 2.1. As motivated in the Introduction, the discrete setting turns out to be a proper framework to formulate this problem. Roughly speaking, no matter how different is the world view of the two agents, we assume they agree on a finite set of possible scenarios. Therefore, any information they have about the preferences of the other, and any risk they consider or exchange, is relative to this set. To put this into mathematical terms, we let A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊂ F be a finite partition of Ω and F A := σ({A 1 , . . . , A n }) the σ−algebra it generates. The A j 's are the base events on which agents agree to exchange risk, and we assume that
This latter condition does not only seem natural, but it is in fact necessary for the existence of optimal allocations. Indeed, assume 0 = P 1 (A j ) < P 2 (A j ) (or vice versa, mutatis mutandis) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then agent 2 could increase her wealth on A j as much as she likes, and agent 1 would take all the risk on A j . Hence, in this situation there cannot be any optimum. Moreover, let Q + be the set of positive rationals, we assume that
which is no restriction in the interesting cases. A finite partition A = {A j } n j=1 of Ω such that {A j } n j=1 ⊂ F and (2.2), (2.3) hold will be called admissible. Now let A = {A j } n j=1 be an admissible partition of Ω. Then the space of admissible financial positions which the agents consider in the exchange of risk, is the collection of all F A −measurable random variables, that we denote by S A . The optimal risk allocation problem, for any aggregate risk X ∈ S A , is therefore formulated as follows:
The solutions (X 1 , X 2 ) to (2.4), i.e. X 1 , X 2 ∈ S A such that X 1 + X 2 = X and U A (X) = 
Clearly the space S A is isomorphic to R n : any X ∈ S A admits a representation of the form
⊂ R, and is identified with the vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n .
In this way, the restriction of the agents' choice functions U i on S A can be read as defined on R n . In order to avoid confusion, we will use lowercase letters to denote functions on
. Note that the functions u i are concave, cashinvariant, normalized, and continuous (since concave and finitely-valued on R n , see e.g. [12] Corollary 2.3). Moreover, u i is monotone whenever U i is monotone. We may now rewrite the optimization problem (2.4) as follows:
where u 1 2u 2 is the so-called convolution of u 1 and u 2 (see (B.5) and e.g. [26] for details on the convolution operation). The function u 1 2u 2 : R n → (−∞, ∞] inherits from u i the concavity and cash-invariance properties. Moreover, due to concavity and the fact that dom(u 1 2u 2 ) = dom(u 1 ) + dom(u 2 ), we either have u 1 2u 2 ≡ +∞ or u 1 2u 2 is finitely-valued and continuous on R n . If there exist optimal allocations of x ∈ R n , i.e. problem (2.5) admits solutions, then the convolution u 1 2u 2 is said to be exact at x. From now on, the penalty functions or dual conjugates (see (B.1)) of u 1 , u 2 , u 1 2u 2 , also defined in R n , are denoted by v 1 , v 2 , v respectively. By P i -law-invariance and Proposition A.1 we obtain the following relation:
which will turn out to be useful in the proof of the main theorem.
Main Result
We work under the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.1. Agent 2 gives a finite penalty to the reference probability measure of agent 1, i.e.
where P 1 is identified with the vector (p 1 , . . . , p n ), with p j = P 1 (A j ) for all j = 1, . . . , n.
If we consider the dual representation of u i on R n via its conjugate v i , which is the analogue of representation (2.1) of U i , Assumption 2.1 says that the reference probability P 1 of agent 1 belongs to the test measures set considered by agent 2.
Note that, by Proposition A.1 and the normalization property, we always have
, which ensures that the convolution function u 1 2u 2 is finitely-valued and continuous.
Assumption 2.2. Either of the following two conditions holds:
The requirement of (NRA) can be seen as a kind of no-arbitrage condition concerning risk, and it is exactly the equilibrium condition given in Burgert and Rüschendorf [7] (see also [6] and [22] ). It says that, in a condition of balance between demand and supply, it is not possible to increase the utility of one agent without decreasing that of the other. This is equivalent to the existence of a no trade equilibrium premium, the notion of which is introduced in Deprez and Gerber [9] , where Pareto optimal allocations are characterized for convex premium principles.
The alternative condition in Assumption 2.2 is more of technical nature. Its meaning is understood when going through the proof of Theorem 3.6. Examples 4.3,4.4 show that we cannot expect optimal allocations in case Assumption 2.2 is not satisfied.
The main result of the paper is the following theorem, which states the existence of optimal allocations for any risk x ∈ R n . Its proof is prepared in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and finally presented in Section 3.3.
be an admissible partition of Ω. Then, under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, the convolution u 1 2u 2 in (2.5) is exact at any x ∈ R n , i.e. problem (2.4) admits solutions for every X ∈ S A .
In Section 4, we compute optimal risk allocations for prominent classes of choice func- 3 Existence of Optimal Allocations
Preliminary Results on Convolution
In this section we provide results which form the basis for the proof of Theorem 2.3. Note that Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 hold true in more general settings, i.e., for more general classes of concave functions and far larger model spaces than R n . Here, for uniformity of notation, we enounce them in the present context. Definition 3.1. For any non empty convex set C ⊆ R n , the recession cone 0 + C is given by
From now on, A 1 , A 2 , and A u12u2 denote the acceptance sets of u 1 , u 2 , and u 1 2u 2 in R n respectively, i.e. A 1 = {x ∈ R n | u 1 (x) ≥ 0} and similarly for u 2 and u 1 2u 2 .
Lemma 3.2. For any
Proof. If dom(v) = ∅, then there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, let x be in 0
and t ≥ 0. Then tx ∈ A 1 and −tx ∈ A 2 , so that sx ∈ A 1 + A 2 ⊆ A u12u2 for any s ∈ R. This implies that for all s ∈ R, 0 ≤ u 1 2u 2 (sx) = inf y∈R n {v(y) + y, sx }, by (B.2). Hence, for any y ∈ dom(v), s y, x = y, sx ≥ −v(y) ∈ R, ∀s ∈ R, which gives y, x = 0, as claimed.
In the lemmas that follow, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the exactness of the convolution u 1 2u 2 .
Lemma 3.3. The convolution u 1 u 2 is exact at every x ∈ R n if and only if
Proof. By definition of convolution, we always have
is exact and take x ∈ A u12u2 . Then 0 ≤ u 1 2u 2 (x) = u 1 (y) + u 2 (x − y) for some y ∈ R n . By cash-invariance we may assume that
Conversely, let A 1 + A 2 = A u12u2 and fix some x ∈ R n . We have
and, by hypothesis, there exists y ∈ R n s.t. y ∈ A 1 and (x − u 1 2u 2 (x) − y) ∈ A 2 . This gives
, where the inequality is indeed an equality by definition of convolution, and therefore the allocation (y, x − y) is optimal for x.
Lemma 3.4. The convolution u 1 u 2 is exact at every x ∈ R n if and only if A 1 + A 2 is closed.
Proof. One implication is immediate from the previous theorem. Indeed, for u 1 2u 2 exact, the set (A 1 + A 2 ) coincides with A u12u2 , which is closed by continuity of u 1 2u 2 . For the reverse implication, we assume that A 1 +A 2 is closed and claim that A 1 +A 2 = A u12u2 . Since the inclusion A 1 + A 2 ⊆ A u12u2 is obvious, we only have to prove the reverse inclusion. To this end, fix x ∈ A u12u2 and consider some maximizing sequence for the convolution in (2.5):
we can find an element (yn, x − yn) of the sequence such that u 1 (yn) + u 2 (x − yn) > 0. This
x, which implies x ∈ A 1 + A 2 because A 1 + A 2 is closed by hypothesis. This proves the equality A u12u2 = A 1 + A 2 . The exactness then follows from Lemma 3.3.
We close this section by stating a condition that ensures the closedness of the sum of two convex sets. The usefulness of this result is obvious by Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.5 (Corollary 9.1.2 in [26] ). Let C 1 , C 2 be non-empty closed convex sets in R n . If there is no x = 0 such that x ∈ 0 + C 1 and −x ∈ 0 + C 2 , then C 1 + C 2 is closed.
Balanced Case
As preparatory result for the proof of Theorem 2.3, in this section we prove the exactness of u 1 2u 2 in (2.5) in case the partition A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } of Ω is balanced w.r.to P 1 , i.e.
Theorem 3.6. Let A = {A j } n j=1 be a P 1 -balanced admissible partition of Ω. Then, under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, the convolution u 1 2u 2 in (2.5) is exact at any x ∈ R n , i.e. problem (2.4) admits solutions for every X ∈ S A .
Before we prove Theorem 3.6, we collect some helpful results. Let us first of all translate the concept of law-invariance into this balanced discrete setting. Let S n be the set of all permutations in {1, . . . , n}. Since, by assumption, partition A is balanced w.r.to P 1 , for any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n and π ∈ S n , we have that n j=1 x π(j) 1 Aj and n j=1 x j 1 Aj have the same law under P 1 . Therefore, the P 1 -law-invariance of U 1 ensures that the induced function u 1 is permutation invariant on R n : u 1 (x π ) = u 1 (x) for all π ∈ S n , where x π is shorthand for
The following lemma will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.6. The assertion is evident and may be proved by induction.
Lemma 3.7. If for x ∈ R n , n ≥ 2, there are i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x i > 0 > x j , then there exist permutations π 1 , . . . , π n−1 ∈ S n such that x π1 , . . . , x πn−1 are linearly independent.
In what follows we denote by π i,j the transposition interchanging i and j. Moreover, E is the permutation invariant function E :
Proof of Theorem 3.6. If n = 1, exactness of u 1 2u 2 follows from cash-invariance. Henceforth, let n ≥ 2. If there is no x ∈ R n \{0} such that x ∈ 0 + A 1 ∩ −0 + A 2 , then the exactness follows from Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.4. Now suppose there exists x = 0 in 0
From Assumption 2.1 and Lemma 3.2, we have that E[x] = 0. Consequently, there are i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x i > 0 > x j . Moreover, x ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 . We claim that this implies the existence of a vector x ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 , x = 0, having the following property:
for all π ∈ S n there exists µ ∈ S n such that −x π = x µ . (3.1)
Suppose that such an x exits. Then, since E[x ] = 0, there are i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Hence, by Lemma 3.7, there exist n − 1 linearly independent permutations x π1 , . . . , x πn−1 of x . Therefore, x π1 , . . . , x πn−1 ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 form a basis of the (n − 1)-dimensional subspace E. Now, choose any y ∈ E. For appropriate
due to (3.1) and the fact that E ∩ 0 + A 1 is a permutation invariant convex cone. Thus Now, by (B.7) we have u 1 2u 2 = E + v 2 (P 1 ). Thus, if condition (i) of Assumption 2.2 holds, then v 2 (P 1 ) = 0 and u 1 2u 2 = E = u 1 , which in particular ensures the exactness of the convolution. On the other hand, if condition (ii) of Assumption 2.2 is satisfied, then for any x ∈ R n and y ∈ −∂v 2 (P 1 ) we obtain u 1 2u
by (B.4). Therefore, the convolution is exact in this case too. Finally, in order to verify that there indeed exists an 0 = x ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 satisfying (3.1), let 0 = x ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 and note that (3.1) is always true for n ≤ 2. In case n > 2, on the other hand, we consider the following algorithm:
else sort x in such a way that the outputx satisfiesx i−2 > 0 andx i−1 < 0, and additionallyx j = 0 for all j < i − 2 in case i > 3.
x :=x + −x i−2 x i−1x πi−2,i−1
x :=x .
end Since E ∩0
+ A 1 is a permutation invariant convex cone, sorting 0 = x ∈ E ∩0 + A 1 as described in the algorithm, the outputx of each cycle is still an element of E ∩ 0 + A 1 , as isx πi−2,i−1 .
xi−1 > 0, then alsox ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 , thus the algorithm never leaves the set E ∩ 0 + A 1 .
Furthermore, in each cycle the algorithm either terminates or eliminates the i − 2-nd entry, that is, it builds a vector x satisfying x i−2 = 0. Since for j = i, . . . , n:
our algorithm does not return the zero vector at any cycle. Indeed, suppose for the moment it did return the zero vector. Then the preceding relations tell us thatx j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i − 2, i − 1} andx i−2 = −x i−1 = a for some a = 0. Thusx is of type (x 1 , . . . ,x i−3 ,x i−2 ,x i−1 ,x i , . . . ,x n ) = (0, . . . , 0, a, −a, 0, . . . , 0), which cannot happen because this implies that the outcome of the previous cycle did satisfy the breaking condition (3.1), and thus the algorithm should already have terminated. Moreover, in case the algorithm does not terminate before all possible n − 2 cycles are through, it returns a vector of type (0, . . . , 0, a, −a) for some a ∈ R\{0}. So finally we find an 0 = x ∈ E ∩ 0 + A 1 which does satisfy (3.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.3
We reduce the general discrete case to a balanced setting in order to apply Theorem 3.6.
Remember that, by admissibility, the probabilities a i := P 1 (A i ) are in Q + for all i = 1, . . . , n, and consider the greatest rational number a s.t. a i /a are all integers for i = 1, . . . , n. By the non-atomicity of (Ω, F, P 1 ) and (Ω, F, P 2 ), for each i = 1, . . . , n we can find a partition {B i1 , . . . , B imi } ⊂ F of the event A i such that
where m i := a i /a (see e.g.
[10] Corollary 1.1). Therefore, we end up with a P 1 -balanced admissible partition B = {B ij , j = 1, . . . , m i , i = 1, . . . , n} of Ω, which is a refinement of partition A and is composed of M := 1/a sets. Denoting by F B the σ-algebra generated by partition B, and S B the space of F B -measurable random variables, we clearly have the inclusions F A ⊆ F B ⊆ F and S A ⊆ S B . Note that P 1 and P 2 restricted to F B are equivalent (the same as in F A ). Moreover, we have that the densities on F A and F B are respectively
by (3.2). Therefore, for any F B -measurable r.v. ξ we have
Now fix X ∈ S A and consider the maximization problem restricted to the F B -measurable pairs:
Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied w.r.to partition B. Then, from Theorem 3.6 we know that problem (3.4) admits solutions for any F B -measurable total risk, thus in particular for the F A -measurable r.v. X we have fixed. Let (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ S B × S B be such a solution. On the one hand, from equality (3.3) we have
On the other hand, by Proposition A.1, the
is at least as good as (X 1 , X 2 ). Thus we may assume that (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ S A × S A . Hence,
so we obtain U A (X) = U 1 (X 1 ) + U 2 (X 2 ), i.e. the exactness of u 1 2u 2 in (2.5). It remains to prove that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are indeed satisfied by u
To this end, note that, according to (2.6), by (3.2) we have
2 ) whenever P 1 ∈ dom(v 2 ). Moreover, it is easily verified that y ∈ ∂v 2 (P 1 ) implies that the vector corresponding to n k=1 
Examples
In what follows we provide some examples of optimal risk sharing problems, including prominent choice functions such as the Entropic Utility and the Mean Variance Choice Function. One of the main ingredients we will use to study the existence of optimal allocations and, in case, to compute them explicitly, is Proposition A.2, which plays an important role whenever we have some information about the gradient of the convolution function.
In Examples 4.1, 4.2 the hypothesis of Theorem 2.3 are satisfied for every admissible partition of Ω, so there always exist Pareto optimal allocations, and we are able to compute them. Actually we can say even more: in these examples, we can formulate and solve the optimal risk sharing problem in continuous setting too, provided some strong link between the different world views.
Example 4.1. (Convolution of Entropic
Utilities) The Entropic Utility w.r.to P i , with parameter β > 0 (see e.g. [20] and [21] ) is given by
where, for any
denotes the relative entropy of Q w.r.to P i . The dual conjugate of Entr i β is given by V i β = βH(.|P i ) on the set of probability measures Q s.t. Q P i , and V i β = +∞ otherwise (see e.g. [18] ). Let β 1 , β 2 > 0 and U i = Entr i βi , i = 1, 2. Note that, for any admissible partition A of Ω, Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 (ii) are satisfied. Hence, for every X ∈ S A there is an optimal allocation (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ S A × S A and it is given in (4.2) below with f = dP1 dP2 | F A . However, for this kind of choice functions we can show even more. Suppose for the moment that P 1 ≈ P 2 with density dP1 dP2 bounded and bounded away from 0. Then,
) and the risk sharing problem is well defined on L p as well, and formulated as
In the following we will show that (4.1) too admits solutions for every X ∈ L p . Note that here we require a strong relation between the world views P 1 and P 2 which we do not in the discrete setting. Denote by f the density dP1 dP2 and consider the bidual (U 1 2U 2 ) * * of the convolution in (4.1) (see (B.2) and (B.6)):
Now, for any aggregate risk X, by choosing
. Therefore, the risk sharing problem (4.1) admits solutions for every X ∈ L p ,
Clearly the very same computation can be done for the bidual of the convolution in the discrete setting (2.5), for any admissible partition A of Ω. Therefore, for any X ∈ S A , we have that an optimal allocation is given by (4.2), keeping in mind that in this case f means Function w.r.to P i , with parameter γ > 0, is given by
and its dual by
, for all Z ∈ L 2 (Ω, F, P i ) with E Pi [Z] = 1, and V i γ (Z) = +∞ otherwise (see e.g. [1] ). Let γ 1 , γ 2 > 0 and U i = M V i γi , i = 1, 2. As in the previous example, Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 (ii) are satisfied for every admissible partition A of Ω, so the existence of optimal allocations follows by Theorem 2.3. Again, we can show even more.
Indeed, if we consider the continuous setting described in Example 4.1, we can prove the exactness of the risk sharing problem in L p as well, for all p ∈ [1, ∞]. In particular, by means of Proposition A.2, we have that an optimal allocation of any given total risk X ∈ S A or X ∈ L p (i.e. when the problem is considered in discrete or in continuous setting) is given by
recalling the different meaning of f in the two cases.
3
The following example shows that, in general, we cannot expect existence of optimal allocations if Assumption 2.2 is not satisfied. Moreover, we present a continuous setting which does not allow for optimal allocations, whereas there are admissible partitions such that problem (2.4) admits solutions.
Example 4.3. Let P 1 ≈ P 2 be such that
The dual conjugate of U 1 is V 1 = δ(·|{P 1 }), which equals zero on P 1 and +∞ elsewhere. The dual of U 2 is given by
if Z Q := dQ/dP 2 ≥ 1/2, and V 2 (Q) = +∞ elsewhere. Moreover, we have that ∂V 2 (Q) = {log(2Z Q − 1) + c : c ∈ R} when well defined, and ∅ elsewhere. Hence, 
and, for z ∈ dom(v 2 ),
Thus ∂v 2 (z) = ∅ if and only if 2z i > P 2 (A i ) for all i = 1, . . . , n, and, provided this holds,
, we always have P 1 ∈ dom(v 2 ). Moreover, by Proposition A.2 in conjunction with the fact that ∂u 1 2u 2 (x) = {P 1 } for all x ∈ R n , we obtain that u 1 2u 2 is exact if and only if condition (ii) of Assumption 2.2 holds. Hence, if there is one j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that are satisfied, and according to (4.3) the optimal risk allocations of any X ∈ S A are given by
Note how the share of agent 2 does not depend on the total risk X. Indeed, what she takes is some measure of the difference between the world views. Clearly, this is equal to zero when
In Example 4.4 we motivate that the smaller the set of base scenarios, the more likely are we to find optimal solutions to the risk sharing problem. Obviously, if there is only one base scenario, i.e. if only cash is exchanged, then, due to cash-invariance, any allocation (x − y, y), y ∈ R, is an optimal allocation of x ∈ R.
Example 4.4. Let A = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 } be a P 1 -balanced partition of Ω and
Let Π : C → R 3 be given by Π(Q) = (Q(A 1 ), Q(A 2 ), Q(A 3 )) and consider the following function
, y ∈ B := z ∈ R 3 :
Note that α is not (sub)differentiable on the boundary of B. Let U 1 be given by
where V 1 (Q) = α(Π(Q)) + δ(Q|C). Moreover, let P 2 be the probability measure given by Since (2/3, 1/6, 1/6) is a boundary point of B, we have that ∂v 3 ∂U 1 2U 2 (X) = ∅ and for any allocation (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ L p ( Ω, G, P) × L p ( Ω, G, P) of X, U 1 2U 2 (X) = U 1 (X 1 ) + U 2 (X 2 ) ⇐⇒ ∂U 1 2U 2 (X) = ∂U 1 (X 1 ) ∩ ∂U 2 (X 2 ).
B Some Functional Analysis
In this section we recall some well-known concepts and results from convex analysis. The gradient of ϕ at X ∈ H is given by ∂ϕ(X) = {µ ∈ H * : ϕ(Y ) ≤ ϕ(X) + µ, Y − X , ∀Y ∈ H} and the gradient of ϕ * at µ ∈ H * by ∂ϕ * (µ) = {X ∈ H : ϕ * (ν) ≥ ϕ * (µ) + ν − µ, X , ∀ν ∈ H * }.
For ϕ proper, concave and u.s.c., the following chain of equivalences holds for any pair (X, µ) ∈ H × H * :
µ ∈ ∂ϕ(X) ⇔ X ∈ −∂ϕ * (µ) ⇔ ϕ(X) = ϕ * (µ) + µ, X . 
